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INTRODUCTION
Since the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (“ADA”)1 was
enacted, it has been contested in the Supreme Court only a minimal
number of times. The Supreme Court has examined issues such as
clarifying the definition of a disability,2 identifying the entities
3
covered by the ADA, determining the appropriate placement for
individuals with mental disabilities,4 and remedying the
contradictions existing between the requirements of the ADA and the
5
requirements of the Social Security Disability Act. The question of
the constitutionality of the ADA has never been raised in front of the
Court, until recently.6
At a time when there is increasing debate regarding the balance of
7
power between the federal government and the states, the ADA has
* J.D. Candidate, American University, Washington College of Law, 2002; B.A., Political
Science, Tufts University, 1999. I would like to thank all of the staff and editors of the Journal of
Gender, Social Policy, and the Law for all their hard work and assistance with this Note. I would
also like to thank my Mom, Dad, and Steven for all their love and support. Finally, my Note
would not have been the same without the support and encouragement of Mason and Allison
— thank you very much for all your help.
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994) (outlawing discrimination against people with
disabilities in employment, public services, public transportation, telecommunications, and
public accommodations or services operated by private entities).
2. See Sutton v. United Airlines, 527 U.S. 471, 482-83 (1999) (holding that in order to
determine if an individual is disabled within the meaning of the ADA, it is important to take
into account any corrective measures the individual with the impairment employs). Therefore,
individuals who are able to correct their vision to 20/20 or better with eyeglasses are not to be
considered disabled. Id. at 481; see also Albertson’s, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555, 566
(1999) (concluding that cases questioning the existence of a disability must be examined on a
case-by-case basis regarding whether an individual is impaired in any major life activities);
Murphy v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 527 U.S. 516, 520 (1999) (relying on Sutton to conclude
that petitioner’s high blood pressure could not be considered a disability when petitioner was
taking medication to control it); Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 637 (1998) (asserting that an
individual with HIV is considered a person with a disability even in the beginning stages of the
disease).
3. See Pa. Dep’t of Corrections v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 210 (1998) (declaring state prisons
to be a state entity subject to the requirements of Title II of the ADA).
4. See Olmstead v. L.C., 527 U.S. 581, 607 (1999) (finding that under Title II of the ADA,
the appropriate placement for people with mental disabilities are community-based settings
when such placement is deemed appropriate by the state’s treatment professionals).
5. See Cleveland v. Policy Mgmt. Sys. Corp., 528 U.S. 795, 807 (1999) (declaring that it is
not a contradiction of terms when an individual claims to be “totally disabled” in order to
collect Social Security Disability Insurance, and at the same time is able to perform the essential
functions of a job under the ADA).
6. See Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 121 S. Ct. 955, 960 (2001) (raising the
question of the constitutionality of Title I of the ADA to the extent that it regulates state
governments); see also 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (1994) (prohibiting discrimination in employment
settings in Title I).
7. See generally United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 617-18 (2000) (finding Congress to
have incorrectly taken over state policing power when enacting the Violence Against Women
Act); Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 67 (2000) (determining that the federal
government invaded the rights of the states when it enacted the Age Discrimination in
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8
fallen in the middle of the controversy. Under the context of the
9
Eleventh Amendment, in February of 2001, the Supreme Court
decided a case questioning whether Title I of the ADA, as it is applied
to state governments, is constitutional when it abrogates states’
Eleventh Amendment rights.10 This case not only raised the issue of
the constitutionality of Title I of the ADA,11 but also the future of
Federalism and the relationship between the states and the federal
12
government.
Board of Trustees of University of Alabama in Birmingham v. Garrett13
arose from two state employees separately filing claims against
Alabama in the district court, after they were forced to leave their
jobs due to their disabilities.14 Both Garrett and Ash filed claims
15
under Titles I and II of the ADA, and section 504 of the
16
Rehabilitation Act. Garrett also included a violation of the Family
and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”)17 in her claim.18 Consolidating the

Employment Act).
8. See Brief for Petitioners, 2000 WL 821035, *2;Garrett, 121 S. Ct. 955 (2001) (arguing
that the ADA’s expansion of congressional authority is at the expense of a diminution of state
sovereignty) (citing Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 455 (1976)).
9. U.S. CONST. amend. XI (“The Judicial power of the United States shall not be
construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the
United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.”).
10. See Garrett, 121 S. Ct. at 960 (questioning whether an individual can sue a state and
recover monetary damages).
11. See Judge David L. Bazelon Center for Mental Health Law, The Garrett Case: New
Challenge to the ADA (Feb. 21, 2000), at http://www.bazelon.org/garrettcase.html (citing how
Garrett calls into question the constitutionality of the ADA).
12. See Peter Schmidt, Supreme Court to Decide Whether Public Colleges May be Sued Under
Disability Law, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Apr. 28, 2000, at A37 (reporting that the Supreme
Court’s decision in Garrett will result in an examination of Federalism).
13. Garrett v. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala., 193 F.3d 1214 (11th Cir. 1999) rev’d, Bd. of Trs.
of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 121 S. Ct. 955, 961 (2001) (consolidating two disability discrimination
claims against state employers).
14. See United States Amicus Curiae for Respondent, Garrett, 121 S. Ct. 955 (2001) available
at http://www.usdoj.gov:80/osg/briefs/1999/0responses/99-1240.resp.html (explaining the
background of the case). Specifically, Respondent Patricia Garrett was demoted with a
significant pay cut from her position with the University of Alabama after she took four months
leave to recover from breast cancer. Id. In addition, Respondent Milton Ash had adverse
employment action taken against him when he reported his employer, Alabama Department of
Youth Services, to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission as a result of the
Department failing to enforce its no-smoking policy and exacerbating Respondent’s asthma. Id.
15. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111-12131 (1994) (prohibiting discrimination against individuals
with disabilities by employers of fifteen or more people, including state and local governments).
16. See 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1994) (outlawing discrimination against people with disabilities in
any federally funded program).
17. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654 (1994) (barring discrimination against employees on
medical leave).
18. See Garrett v. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala., 989 F. Supp. 1409, 1410 (N.D. Ala. 1998)
(establishing the similarities and differences between Patricia Garrett’s and Milton Ash’s cases).
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two cases, the district court dismissed the case on grounds that
Alabama’s sovereign immunity was not properly abrogated in any of
19
the statutes. Upon review by the circuit court, the lower court’s
decision regarding the ADA and section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act
20
was overruled. However, the court upheld the decision that the
FMLA did not properly abrogate Alabama’s Eleventh Amendment
right.21 In April of 2000, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to
22
review the question of the constitutionality of the ADA. Yet, when
analyzing the issues in question, the Court limited its review to Title I
of the ADA as it affects state employers.23
Part I of this Note explains the various factors and tests the Court
took into account when determining if the ADA constitutionally
24
abrogates states’ Eleventh Amendment Right. Parts II and III of this
Note examine the ramifications of the Court’s decisions. Part II
discusses the potential future for people with disabilities following the
Court’s decision to strike down one section of the ADA.25 Finally,
Part III of this Note discusses the future of Federalism and states’
rights in this country had the Court upheld the constitutionality of
the ADA.26

19. See id. at 1412 (holding that Congress did not properly enact the legislation in
question, thus Alabama’s immunity could not be abrogated); see also text, infra Part I.
20. See Garrett, 193 F.3d at 1217-18 (finding the ADA and section 504 of the Rehabilitation
Act to specifically state Congress’ intent to abrogate the states’ Eleventh Amendment immunity
right and to be enacted pursuant to valid exercises of Congressional power); see also text, infra
Part I.
21. See id. at 1219-20 (believing Congress’ intent to abrogate states’ immunity under the
FMLA was not as clear as the ADA or the Rehabilitation Act and that Congress’ enforcement of
this law was not completely remedial in nature); see also text, infra Part I.
22. See Bd. of Trs. v. Garrett, 529 U.S. 1065 (2000) (granting certiorari to review Congress’
authority to abrogate states’ Eleventh Amendment immunity right under Titles I and II of the
ADA).
23. See Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala., 121 S. Ct. at 960 n.1 (finding the issue of the
constitutionality of Title II of the ADA was insufficiently briefed and therefore could not be
decided at the time).
24. See Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 55 (1996) (establishing the test to
determine whether Congress properly abrogated states’ Eleventh Amendment right in
particular legislation); see also City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 519-20 (1997) (refining the
Seminole Tribe of Florida test).
25. See Garrett, 121 S. Ct. at 960 (invalidating Title I of the ADA as it applies to state
governments); see also Eve Hill, Advances, But Still Problems, SUN SENTINEL, Aug. 1, 2000, at 17A
(reporting that if current attacks on the ADA are successful, the accomplishments of the ADA
thus far, are likely to be lost).
26. See Marcia Coyle, Justices Tinker with Federalism Trend, But Watch Out Next Term, NAT’L
L.J., June 5, 2000, at A1 (showing how the Supreme Court is slowly changing the current
structure of this country’s federalist government).
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DETERMINING THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE AMERICANS WITH
DISABILITIES ACT OF 1990
A. Explanation of Established Standards

When the Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of the
ADA, and its abrogation of the Eleventh Amendment, the Court had
to determine if the Act satisfied the two-prong test established in
27
First, the Court considered
Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida.
whether Congress unequivocally stated within the statute its intent to
28
abrogate the states’ Eleventh Amendment immunity. Congress must
clearly state its intent to abrogate states’ immunity; it cannot
generally authorize a party to sue a state in federal court.29 Second,
the Court had to determine if Congress passed the statute “pursuant
30
to a valid exercise of power.”
To determine whether Congress specifically sought to abrogate
states’ Eleventh Amendment right, the Court must simply examine
31
the text of a statute. However, to determine whether a statute is a
valid exercise of Congressional power under section five of the
32
Fourteenth Amendment, the purpose of the Amendment first must
be explained.33 While the Court has previously recognized that
section five is “a positive grant of legislative power” to be used by
Congress to remedy constitutional violations, section five is also
viewed as a limited source of power.34
27. 517 U.S. at 55 (stating the ways in which Congress could legitimately abrogate states’
Eleventh Amendment immunity); see, e.g., Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v.
College Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 635-36 (1999) (applying the two-prong test to determine if
Congress’ enactment of the Patent Remedy Act validly abrogated states’ sovereign immunity);
Kimel, 528 U.S. at 72-73 (using the test stated within Seminole Tribe to examine if the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) properly abrogated states’ Eleventh Amendment
immunity right).
28. See Seminole Tribe of Fla., 517 U.S. at 55 (concluding Congress must clearly state its
intent when abrogating state immunity) (citing Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 68 (1985)).
29. See id. (holding that Congress’ intent must be obvious) (citing Atascadero State Hosp.
v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 238-39 (1985)).
30. Id. (examining the constitutionality of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act to see if it
was a valid act of Congress’ Enforcement power of the Fourteenth Amendment).
31. See id. at 56 (examining the text of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act to find Congress’
clear intent for abrogation).
32. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5 (stating that “Congress shall have the power to enforce,
by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.”).
33. See Flores, 521 U.S. at 516-29 (explaining the purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment
before determining whether the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA”) was a valid
exercise of Congressional power under section five of the Fourteenth Amendment).
34. See Flores, 521 U.S. at 517-19 (declaring that section five is to be used solely to enforce
the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment, thus giving Congress remedial power only)
(citing Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 651 (1966)).
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In previous Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence, the Court
determined that Congress did not have the authority to declare what
constitutional rights and violations are comprised of in order to
enforce them.35 Thus, recognizing the intent of the authors of the
Fourteenth Amendment, the Court was careful not to grant Congress
too much power out of fear that the federal government will begin to
overpower the states, causing the current structure of government to
36
Under section five of the Fourteenth
be seriously altered.
Amendment, Congress is only to enact legislation that carries out the
objectives of the Amendment, enforces prohibitions, and secures the
equality of civil rights for all citizens.37 These goals have subsequently
been interpreted to allow Congress to use the Fourteenth
Amendment solely as a remedial and preventative measure.38
Once the Court determined the purposes of the Fourteenth
Amendment, it also recognized that it is extremely difficult to
determine exactly when Congress is enacting legislation to cure
constitutional violations and when it is making substantive changes to
39
constitutional rights. Therefore, the Court declared it would give
Congress a significant amount of latitude when determining if
legislation was enacted appropriately pursuant to the Fourteenth
Amendment.40 The only requirement the Court imposed upon such
legislation was that there had to be a “congruence and
proportionality between the injury to be prevented or remedied and
the means adopted to that end.”41
Legislation is considered legitimate under this test and is
considered proportional if the statute’s requirements upon states do
35. See id. at 519 (explaining that “[t]he design of the Amendment and the text of section
five are inconsistent with the suggestion that Congress has the power to decree the substance of
the Fourteenth Amendment’s restrictions on the States”).
36. See id. at 521-22 (reviewing the history and debates surrounding the enactment of the
Fourteenth Amendment).
37. See id. at 517 (explaining the domain of congressional power under section five of the
Fourteenth Amendment) (citing Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 345-46 (1879)).
38. See id. at 526 (remarking how the Court has acknowledged Congress’ need to use
strong remedial measures to respond to persisting deprivation of constitutional rights since
South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966)).
39. See Flores, 521 U.S. at 519 (reconciling the differences by explaining that while Congress
has the power to protect individuals’ rights by legislating against constitutional violations,
Congress does not have the authority to define constitutional rights).
40. See id. at 519-20 (explaining the difficulty in distinguishing between remedies of
unconstitutional actions and substantive changes in governing law and the need to grant
Congress wide latitude in determining where the distinction lies).
41. Id.; see generally Kimel, 528 U.S. at 82 (applying the congruence and proportionality test
by reviewing the legislative record of the ADEA); Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense
Bd., 527 U.S. at 637-38 (reviewing the decision in Flores in order to apply the congruence and
proportionality test to Patent Remedy Act); .
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not reach beyond the requirements that the Constitution imposes
42
upon states. For instance, a statute may not restrict states’ practices
any more than what is considered unconstitutional under the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.43 Moreover, for a
law to be considered congruent, the Court needs to find clear
evidence substantiating the need for the law within the statute’s
legislative record.44 For example, when the Court reviewed the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act in City of Boerne v. Flores, the
Justices examined whether Congress identified a significant pattern
of particular violations by the states that were clearly
45
unconstitutional. It is insufficient for Congress to recognize and
enact legislation as a result of incidental burdens upon individuals’
rights; evidence of widespread discrimination is required.46

42. See Kimel, 528 U.S. at 85-86 (declaring the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
(“ADEA”) to be unconstitutional since it requires states to justify their actions with more than a
rational reason, which is all that is required under constitutional standards).
43. See id. at 81-82 (explaining that since age classifications do not violate the Equal
Protection Clause, states may discriminate against such classes of people as long as the states
possess a rational reason for doing so); see generally Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214,
216 (1944) (declaring that restrictions that curtail the civil rights of certain groups are
immediately suspect); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctrs., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985)
(explaining that although the general rule is that state legislation will be sustained if the
classifications drawn by the statute are rationally related to a legitimate state interest, this rule is
abandoned when the Court considers legislation that creates classifications that are suspect).
For example, when the Court is considering a statute that classifies individuals by race, alienage
or national origin, it will subject the statute to strict scrutiny and sustain the legislation only if it
is narrowly tailored to meet a compelling state interest. Id. The reason the Court will subject
this type of legislation to such scrutiny is because the Justices do not believe that any legislation
that creates classifications based on race, alienage, or national origin is relevant to any
legitimate state interest; rather, these laws usually only reflect individuals’ prejudice and
antipathy. Id. Another instance in which the Court will depart from its general stated rule is if
it is examining legislation that classifies individuals based upon gender. Id. at 441. In these
instances, the Court will subject the statute in question to heightened scrutiny. Id. The state
will need to explain how the statute is substantially related to an important governmental
interest in order to have the legislation sustained. Id. The reason for this scrutiny is because
often legislation that creates gender classification has no sensible reason for the differential
treatment. Id. at 440.
44. See Kimel, 528 U.S. at 81-82 (explaining how Congress failed to recognize a pattern of
widespread violations committed by the states affecting individuals due to their age).
Therefore, the Court concluded that the ADEA failed the congruence and proportionality test.
Id.
45. See Flores, 521 U.S. at 530 (noting how RFRA’s record lacks any evidence of a state law
passed in the last forty years as a result of religious bigotry); Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ.
Expense Bd., 527 U.S. at 638 (remarking how Congress failed to recognize a pattern of patent
infringements by the states or even a pattern of constitutional violations).
46. See Flores, 521 U.S. at 531 (recognizing that Congress’ reliance on anecdotal evidence
and concern for incidental burdens was not enough support the enactment of the RFRA).
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B. Application of Established Standards to the ADA
1.

Abrogation is Specifically Addressed within the ADA

When reviewing Garrett, Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority
in a five-to-four opinion, easily recognized that the first prong of the
Seminole test, whether abrogation is specifically stated within the ADA,
47
was undisputed. In Title V of the ADA, Congress specifically stated,
“a state shall not be immune under the Eleventh Amendment to the
Constitution of the United States from an action in Federal or State
court of competent jurisdiction for a violation of this Act.”48 A
statement such as this not only unequivocally states Congress’ intent,
but also has been recognized by the Supreme Court to satisfy the
intent requirement of the Seminole test when analyzed in other
49
statutes.
2.

Congress’ Authority to Enact the ADA
a.

There was no need for Congress to remedy constitutional violations
on behalf of the states with the enactment of the ADA

The first consideration Justice Rehnquist took into account when
reviewing Congress’ authority to pass the ADA was whether Congress
was remedying constitutional violations committed by the states when
enacting the ADA.50 To determine whether states were committing
constitutional violations in the first place, it was necessary for the
Court to re-evaluate its case law to determine the type of protection
to afford to people with disabilities under the Equal Protection
Clause.51
The last time the Supreme Court seriously considered this issue was

47. See Garrett, 121 S. Ct. at 962 (recognizing that the intent of the ADA was clear and
undisputed).
48. 42 U.S.C. § 12202 (1994).
49. See generally Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. at 635 (holding that
Congress’ intent to abrogate could not have been clearer when enacting the Patent Remedy Act
and stating, “any State . . . shall not be immune, under the Eleventh Amendment of the
Constitution of the United States . . . .”) (citing 35 U.S.C. § 296(a)); Kimel, 528 U.S. at 73-74
(2000) (concluding Congress clearly intended to abrogate states’ immunity stating that an
individual can seek relief from various employers, including state agencies).
50. See Garrett, 121 S. Ct. at 962-63 (examining the limitations of section one of the
Fourteenth Amendment in regards to the parameters its places on the states’ treatment of the
population of people with disabilities).
51. See id. at 963 (reviewing its previous holding in Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473
U.S. 432 (1985), where the Court ruled that legislation affecting people with disabilities needed
only to have a rational basis in order to be considered constitutional).
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52
in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Centers. The Court determined
that people with mental retardation are not part of a suspect
53
classification that would require the city to possess a compelling
state interest when it denied a special permit for the construction of a
54
group home. Rather, the Court declared the mentally challenged to
be a non-suspect class that would only require the city’s actions to be
rationally related to a valid state interest.55
The Court cited four main reasons for denying individuals with
56
mental retardation suspect classification status. First, it was up to
the legislature, not the judiciary, to decide how this large and diverse
57
group was to be treated. Second, the legislative response to people
who are mentally challenged proves that these people face unique
problems that have been addressed by Congress in order to eliminate
antipathy and prejudiced views.58 Third, this group of individuals is
not politically powerless.59 Finally, the Court believed that if the
mentally retarded were afforded suspect status, the Court would not
know where to draw the line when it came to other individuals with
similar immutable disabilities.60
After examining this holding in Garrett, the Court saw no reason to
require anything more of the states than a rational reason in the

52. 473 U.S. 432, 438-39 (1985) (determining whether the City of Cleburne discriminated
against persons with mental retardation when it denied a special permit to build a group home
for such individuals and subsequently determined that people with mental retardation were not
to be considered a suspect class).
53. See id. at 442 (explaining that the Court of Appeals was wrong to declare people with
mental retardation a quasi-suspect class).
54. See id. at 440 (declaring only statutes affecting race, alienage, and national origin to be
suspect and subject to strict scrutiny to ensure that they are narrowly tailored to serve a
compelling state interest).
55. See id. at 440 (observing that the general rule applied to all legislation not affecting
suspect classification is that the legislation will be sustained as long as the classification drawn is
rationally related to a legitimate state interest).
56. See id. at 442-46 (creating distinctions between the disabled population and other
suspect populations in order to demonstrate how the disabled cannot be included in such a
classification).
57. See Cleburne, 472 U.S. at 442-43 (describing the difference among people with
disabilities to range from those whose disabilities are not immediately evident to those who
require constant care).
58. See id. at 443 (recognizing that Congress has already enacted section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973 to ensure the integration of people with disabilities in federally
funded programs; the Developmental Disabilities Assistance and Bill of Rights Act enabling
individuals with disabilities to have access to appropriate treatment and rehabilitation services;
and the Education of the Handicapped Act that dedicated federal education funds to ensure
that children with disabilities possess an appropriate and integrated educational setting).
59. See id. at 445 (acknowledging that the disabled population has the ability to have its
opinions heard by government officials, as evidenced by the legislature’s response).
60. See id. at 444-46 (expressing concern for creating a slippery slope).
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61
states’ treatment of individuals with disabilities. Justice Rehnquist
explained that the Fourteenth Amendment is not violated when a
state decides to act upon the differences between individuals with
disabilities and the rest of the population when there is a rational
62
reason for the action. Furthermore, the majority clearly established
that the presence of negative attitudes and fears in the minds of state
decision-makers does not alone establish a constitutional violation.63
The Court concluded that as long as states are acting rationally they
are not required under the Fourteenth Amendment to make special
accommodations for people with disabilities.64 Justice Rehnquist
stated, “[t]he [states] could quite hard headedly – and perhaps
hardheartedly – hold to job-qualification requirements which do not
make allowance[s] for the disabled.”65

b.

Legislative findings do not support the enactment of the ADA

In addition to examining whether Congress was remedying
constitutional violations by the states with the enactment of the ADA
in order to determine whether the statute is congruent and
proportional, the Court also needed to review the legislative findings
66
of the statute. In doing this, the Court recognized that Congress
enacted the ADA “to provide clear, strong, consistent, enforceable
standards addressing discrimination against individuals with
disabilities”67 as a result of finding more than forty-three million
61. See Garrett, 121 S. Ct. at 963-64 (agreeing with its reasons in Cleburne that to hold
individuals with disabilities as a quasi-suspect class would be wrong when they could not be
distinguished from a variety of other groups who have similar immutable characteristics (citing
Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 445-46)).
62. See id. at 963-64 (classifying states’ treatment of individuals with disabilities as legitimate
as long as there is a rational reason for the states to draw a distinction between individuals with
disabilities and other groups of people) (citing Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 320 (1993)).
63. See id. at 964 (restating the notion that state action subjected to rational basis scrutiny
and found to exist to further a rational interest of the state is constitutional).
64. See id. (explaining that if states are required to make special accommodations for
individuals with disabilities then this requirement would need to come from “positive law and
not through the Equal Protection Clause”). The Court did not explain “positive law,” however
the Court noted that when Congress enacted the ADA all fifty states possessed some type of law
that protected individuals with disabilities. Id. at 964 n.5. Further, most of these laws did not
possess as extensive requirements as the ADA with accommodations. Id.
65. Garrett, 121 S. Ct. at 964 .
66. See id. at 964-65 (recognizing the need to identify a history and pattern of
unconstitutional employment discrimination by the states in order to find the ADA congruent);
Cf. Flores, 521 U.S. at 531 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (believing that RFRA cannot be deemed
remedial or preventive legislation after reviewing its legislative findings); Kimel, 528 U.S. at 88
(declaring that the Court’s task is to determine whether ADEA is appropriate legislation and
that one way the Court had made such a determination in the past was by examining the
legislative record containing the reasons for Congress’ action).
67. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(2) (1994); Garrett, 121 S. Ct. at 965 (restating the general
findings Congress made in the ADA).
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68
Americans with one or more physical or mental disabilities. The
Court also noted how Congress found that society historically has
69
Although the Court
isolated individuals with disabilities.
acknowledged that through these findings Congress clearly
established the existence of discrimination against people with
disabilities, the Court did not believe that these findings involved any
activities on the part of the states.70 The Court characterized the
evidence that Congress assembled regarding state activities as merely
minimal evidence of unconstitutional state discrimination in the area
of employment.71
The Court continued by discounting the Appendix to Justice
Breyer’s dissenting opinion that listed detailed accounts of
discriminatory actions on behalf of the states found within the
72
legislative history. The Court believed that these violations were
nothing more than “anecdotal accounts of ‘adverse disparate
73
treatment by state officials.’” Furthermore, the Court noted that the
Task Force on the Rights and Empowerment of Americans with
Disabilities, who compiled the findings listed in Appendix C,
included no findings on the subject of state discrimination in the
area of employment.74 Finally, the Court found the legislative

68. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(1) (1994).
69. See Garrett, 121 S. Ct. at 965 (finding that “despite some improvements, such forms of
discrimination against individuals with disabilities continue to be a serious and pervasive social
problem”) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(2) (1994)); see also 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1)
(recognizing the need for a “comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of
discrimination against individuals with disabilities”).
70. See Garrett, 121 S. Ct. at 965 (explaining how several of the incidents of discriminatory
actions by state officials cited in the legislative record “together fall far short of even suggesting
the pattern of unconstitutional discrimination on which § 5 legislation must be based”); see also
Charles D. Brown, Comment, Congressional Abrogation of the Eleventh Amendment Immunity by
Passing the ADEA and the ADA, 51 BAYLOR L. REV. 339, 360 (1999) (arguing that the ADA lacks
evidence of any actions by the states that are violations of the Constitution under the
established Supreme Court standards).
71. See Garrett, 121 S. Ct. at 965-66 (noting that when the ADA was passed and Congress
found some forty-three million Americans to have one or more physical or mental impairments,
the states were employing four and one half million of these people) (citing U.S. Department
of Commerce, Bureau of Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States 338 (119th ed. 1999)
(Table 534)).
72. See Garrett, 121 S. Ct. at app. C (Breyer, J., with whom Stevens, Souter and Ginsburg, JJ.,
join, dissenting) (listing by state each violation against a person with a disability accumulated by
the Task Force on Rights and Empowerment of Americans with Disabilities at the time Congress
enacted the ADA).
73. See id. at 966 (explaining how the Court had previously determined that adverse
disparate treatment does not amount to a constitutional violation where rational basis scrutiny
applies).
74. See Garrett, 121 S. Ct. at 966 (predicting that, had Congress understood the information
from the Task Force as reflecting a pattern of unconstitutional conduct on behalf of the states,
Congress would have reflected this information in the legislative findings of the statute).
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findings to be insufficient when both the House and Senate
committee reports on the ADA established that the only incidents of
discrimination found in the area of employment existed in the
75
private sector. The Court contended that any evidence presented in
the findings or history of the ADA that could amount to
constitutional violations by the States in the area of employment were
so general and brief that no concrete conclusions could be drawn
76
from them.
C. Other Judicial Considerations
Not only did the Court find the ADA to be lacking in its initial
purposes and legislative history in regards to the states, but the Court
also found the ADA to be lacking in congruency since it required
77
One of the
more of the states than the Federal Constitution.
requirements stated within Title I of the ADA, is that employers make
reasonable accommodations for their employees with disabilities as
long as such accommodations do not impose undue hardships upon
the employers.78 However, the Court found fault with the statute
when it defined a range of undue hardships that are rationally
79
The Court further contended that it was
reasoned as unlawful.
wrong for the ADA to place the burden upon the employer in
explaining the reason for the undue hardship, instead of placing the
burden on the complaining party to negate a reasonable basis for the
employer’s decision.80 Finally, the Court believed state action that has
a disparate impact upon an individual with disabilities is alone not

75. See id. at 966 (concluding, “[d]iscrimination still persists in such critical areas as
employment in the private sector.”) (quoting S. REP. NO. 101-116 at 6 (1989)). The Court also
found that the House Committee on Education and Labor reached similar conclusions in
stating “there exists a compelling need to establish a clear and comprehensive Federal
prohibition of discrimination on the basis of disability in the areas of employment in the private
sector . . . .”). See id. at 967 (citing H.R. REP. No. 101-485, at 28 (1990)).
76. See Garrett, 121 S. Ct. at 966 n.7 (recognizing that the majority of evidence recorded of
discrimination by the states revolved around state public services and accommodations).
77. See id. at 967 (finding the remedies created by the ADA against the states to cause great
concern with statute’s congruency and proportionality).
78. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (1994) (requiring employers to provide employees with
disabilities reasonable accommodations unless the employers can demonstrate that the
accommodations would impose an undue burdens on the operation of the business).
79. See Garrett, 121 S. Ct. at 966-67 (setting out the example of a state employer seeking to
conserve financial resources as a rational reason for the employer to hire an applicant able to
use the existing facility). This is unlike the requirements of the ADA where this employer
would be required to make the facility readily accessible and usable by individuals with
disabilities. See id. (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111(9), 12112(5)(B)).
80. See id. at 967 (stating that the Constitution requires that the complaining party show
cause for why an accommodation is not an undue hardship).
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enough to constitute a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The majority concluded its opinion in Garrett by restating how the
ADA is a statute attempting to remedy violations by the states that in
82
fact are not violations at all. Therefore, the Court concluded that
the ADA is not a remedy that is congruent and proportional to the
violations it targets.83 Comparing the ADA to the Voting Rights Act of
1965, the Court found “stark” differences between the two, thus
84
rationalizing the need for one but not the other.
D. Considerations Not Taken Into Account by the Court
It should be noted that there are several factors the Court failed to
take into consideration when it determined that a section of the ADA
was not a valid act of congressional power. First, in Cleburne v.
Cleburne Independent Living Center, the Court declared that it is initially
up to the legislature, not the judiciary, to determine how the Equal
85
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is to be enforced.
With the enactment of the ADA, which occurred five years after the
decision rendered in Cleburne, Congress had determined the way in
86
which people with disabilities are to be treated.
In Cleburne, the Court also declared that the status of a suspect
classification is to be extended to those groups of people who have
had a history of purposeful unequal treatment, and have been
subjected to unique disabilities on the basis of inaccurate
87
stereotypical characteristics. The Court believed that individuals in

81. See id. (describing how Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence has yet to stand for the
notion that a law may be unconstitutional merely because it produces a disparate impact)
(citing Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976)).
82. See id. at 967-68 (recognizing that although Congress is the final authority in
establishing public policy, it cannot enable private individuals to recover monetary damages
from states when there is no record of discriminatory violations in the first place).
83. See Garrett, 121 S. Ct. at 967-68 (finding that the ADA did not meet the requirements of
the Court initially established in Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Fla., 517 U.S. 44 (1996), and to find that
it does would unnecessarily broaden present congressional authority); see also text, supra Part I.
84. See Garrett, 121 S. Ct. at 968 (recognizing the ADA’s constitutional shortcomings when
the record of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 possessed a significant pattern of unconstitutional
action by the states that could not be prevented in any other way but with the enactment of the
legislation).
85. See Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 439-40 (stating that “Section 5 of the Amendment empowers
Congress to enforce this mandate [equal protection to all], but absent controlling
congressional direction, the courts have themselves devised standards for determining the
validity of state legislation . . . .”).
86. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (1994) (declaring people with disabilities to possess all
characteristics that define a suspect class).
87. See Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 441 (explaining how discrimination on the basis of race and
national origin, which are suspect classifications, is unlike discrimination on the basis of age)
(citing Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313 (1976)).
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suspect classifications possess immutable characteristics, and statutes
against such individuals have little, if any, relevance to the
88
achievement of a legitimate state interest. Congress took note of
these characteristics as well as others, and declared individuals with
89
disabilities to be a suspect classification. Some have even argued
that in section 12101(5) of the ADA, Congress has attempted to
remove the rational basis standard applied to people with disabilities
when it discusses the need to eliminate the “overprotective rules and
policies” and “exclusionary qualification standards and criteria.”90
Finally, the Court failed to take into account the fact that although
the Justices stated that a rational basis analysis was applied to the
questions raised in Cleburne, in reality the Court actually applied a
91
If the Court had applied a traditional
much stricter standard.
rational basis test, the ordinance would have been found valid
because Texas possessed legitimate concerns when denying the
special permit.92 Instead, the Court invalidated the ordinances, but
only after they were “subjected to precisely the sort of probing inquiry
associated with heightened scrutiny.”93

88. See id. at 440-41 (relaying the characteristics of previously deemed suspect
classifications); see also City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctrs., 473 U.S. 432, 465-68 (1985)
(Marshall, J., joined by Brennan and Blackmun, JJ., concurring in part of the judgment and
dissenting in part) (drawing similarities between individuals with disabilities and other classes of
people that have been deemed suspect and explaining how the disabled have been subjected to
the same forms of prejudices, inequalities and discrimination).
89. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(7) (1994) (declaring that “individuals with disabilities are a
discrete and insular minority who have been . . . subjected to a history of purposeful unequal
treatment, and relegated to a position of political powerlessness in our society, [based] on
characteristics that are beyond the control of such individuals and resulting from stereotypic
assumptions . . .”); see also Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 461 (Marshall, J., joined by Brennan and
Blackmun, JJ., concurring in part of the judgment and dissenting in part) (declaring the
disabled were subjected to a history of discrimination that can only be described as
“grotesque”).
90. James B. Miller, Note and Comment, The Disabled, the ADA, & Strict Scrutiny, 6 ST.
THOMAS L. REV. 393, 410 (1994) (arguing that certain language was placed in the ADA as a
direct response to the Court’s decision in Cleburne).
91. See Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 456 (Marshall, J., joined by Brennan and Blackmun, JJ.,
concurring in part of the judgment and dissenting in part) (contending that, had the majority
examined the ordinance under a true rational-basis analysis, the Justices would have found it to
be constitutional because that state had rational reasons for denying the permit).
92. See id. at 458 (explaining that the majority recognizes the City’s legitimate concerns for
fire hazards, but places them aside, and instead reviews the statute’s legislative record, when
under the traditional rational review standard the state’s reasoning alone would suffice, and
there would be no need to review the legislative record).
93. Id. at 458.
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II. THE EFFECTS OF THE COURT’S DECISION ON THE DISABILITY
COMMUNITY
There are several ramifications for people with disabilities as a
result of the Supreme Court’s decision in Garrett which prevents
private individuals from bringing suits against states and obtaining
94
monetary damages. It should be noted, however, that the Court’s
decision only prevents individuals from bringing suits against their
state governments.95 The holding in Garrett does not prevent
96
individuals from initiating suits against local governments.
Therefore, as a direct result of this case state employers will no longer
need to comply with ADA’s requirements that ensure individuals with
97
disabilities are not discriminated against in the work place.
Moreover, it is quite possible that soon states will no longer be
required to comply with any of the provisions of the ADA.98 Yet,
individuals with disabilities will still have some protection against state
governments as long as the ADA is recognized as being constitutional
under Congress’ Commerce Clause authority.

94. See Garrett, 121 S. Ct. at 960 (holding that suits by state employees against their
employers are prohibited); Judge David L. Bazelon Center for Mental Health Law, supra note
11, at http://www.bazelon.org/garrettcase.html (explaining the different ways that people with
disabilities will be affected by Supreme Court ruling in the states’ favor in Garrett).
95. See Garrett, 121 S. Ct. at 965 (agreeing with the Respondents that the holding in the
case applies to “state actors”).
96. See id. at 965 (explaining the limits of Eleventh Amendment Immunity which does not
extend to units of local governments (citing Lincoln County v. Luning, 133 U.S. 529, 530
(1890))).
97. Judge David L. Bazelon Center for Mental Health Law, supra note 11, at
http://www.bazelon.org/garrettcase.html (referring to state employers’ ability to stop granting
reasonable accommodations to employees with disabilities and not be prevented from refusing
to hire a person simply because of their disability).
98. See Garrett, 121 S. Ct. at 960 n.1 (limiting the Court’s decision to Title I of the ADA, the
employment section, as it applies to state employers). The Court declined to review the
constitutionality of Title II of the ADA, state and local governments, since the issue was not
adequately briefed in the present case. See id. But see Linda Greenhouse, Justices Give States
Immunity From Suits by Disabled Workers, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 22, 2001), available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2001/02/22politics/22SCOT.html (reporting how the Justices will
soon consider whether to grant a writ of certiorari to a case questioning state immunity claims
to Title II of the ADA that requires states to make their service and programs accessible); Judge
David L. Bazelon Center for Mental Health Law, supra note 11, at
http://www.bazelon.org/garrettcase.html (discussing how states will no longer be required to
make their buildings, programs or services accessible to individuals with disabilities). In
addition, it may be possible for states to disregard the ADA’s integration mandate of placing
individuals with disabilities in community settings and removing them from state institutions,
hospitals, and nursing homes. Id.
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A. The ADA is a valid exercise of Congress’ Commerce Clause Authority
In order for any individual to still have his/her rights protected by
the ADA, the constitutionality of the ADA would need to rest upon
Article I, Section 8, of the Constitution, which sets out Congress’
99
authority to enact legislation to regulate commerce. However, since
only a minimal number of courts have had the opportunity to
examine this argument, it is necessary to explain how the ADA is a
legitimate act of Congress’ Commerce Clause power.100
The United States Constitution specifically grants Congress the
ability “to regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the
101
several States, and with the Indian Tribes.” For years the Supreme
Court defined this power to be a plenary power that is limited by
nothing except those prescribed limitations found within the
Constitution itself.102 The power to regulate commerce is understood
as the legislature’s ability to proscribe rules regarding how commerce
103
Moreover, the Court defined commerce to be
is to be governed.
not only traffic, but also commercial intercourse of anything that can
104
The transportation of
be traded between countries and states.
people, as passengers in interstate commerce, is even recognized as
falling within the realm of Congress’ authority.105 The Court declared
that no sort of trade could be carried out which this congressional
106
power could not regulate. Finally, the Court noted that while this
power does not extend to the intercourse of any trade that may take
99. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(4) (1994) (explaining that the ADA was enacted under
Congress’ authority to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment and its power to regulate
commerce).
100. See Ira Burnim, Legal Theories Behind State Challenges to Constitutionality of Title II of the
ADA (Jan. 12, 2000), available at http://www.protectionandadvocacy.com/legaltheories.html
(affirming that there are no federal court cases addressing the constitutionality of the ADA
pursuant to the Commerce Clause).
101. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (stating the limits of Congress’ Commerce Clause
authority).
102. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 3 (1824) (declaring the Commerce Clause power to
be similar to all other vested powers of Congress, which are independent and limitless). See,
e.g., Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 253-54 (1964) (relying on the
creation of Commerce Clause jurisprudence in the Gibbons review of the Civil Rights Act of
1964).
103. See Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 3 (defining the regulation of commerce).
104. See id. at 189-90, 193-94 (remarking that the Commerce Clause is to be used to regulate
“every species of commercial intercourse”).
105. See Heart of Atlanta Motel, 379 U.S. at 256 (proclaiming that commerce among states
consists of the intercourse of traffic as well as the transportation of people and property) (citing
Hoke v. United States, 227 U.S. 308, 320 (1913)).
106. See Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 3-4 (explaining that this power can be used to regulate virtually
anything traveling in commerce).
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place within one state, it is to be extended to all trade that crosses
107
multiple state lines or involves more than one state.
Over the years, the Court has recognized Congress’ Commerce
Clause power as a legitimate way for the legislature to regulate
channels of interstate commerce, protect instrumentalities (including
persons or things carrying or traveling within interstate commerce),
and secure those activities that have substantial affects on interstate
108
commerce. Congress’ ability to regulate activities that substantially
affect commerce has been extended to include some intrastate
109
These are actions that, when combined with others
actions.
similarly situated, will affect commerce substantially.110 Thus, a twopart test established by the Court must first be satisfied in any
111
First, a court needs to ensure that the
Commerce Clause case.
activity being regulated by Congress is commerce affecting more than
one state.112 Second, the activity in question must have substantial
113
relation to the national economy.
One of the first cases the Supreme Court analyzed regarding
Congress’ use of the Commerce Clause to enact a civil rights statute
114
In examining the
was Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States.
case, the Court declared that the standard for sustaining legislation as
a valid action under the Commerce Clause would require Congress to
possess a rational reason for the statute’s enactment.115 Specifically,
107. See id. at 4 (interpreting the word “among” within the Commerce Clause to extend to
commerce that concerns more than one state).
108. See Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n, Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 276
(1981) (stating how Congress should exercise Commerce Clause powers) (citing Perez v.
United States, 402 U.S. 146, 150 (1971)).
109. See Heart of Atlanta Motel, 379 U.S. at 258 (recognizing that the commerce power
extends to the ability to regulate local intrastate activities if they will have substantial and
harmful effects upon interstate commerce).
110. See id. (illustrating that the discriminatory actions of one motel is a purely local matter,
but when combined with the actions of numerous local motels, substantial affects upon
interstate commerce are evident).
111. See id. at 254-55 (taking into consideration the power of Congress and its need to
maintain some amount of control over interstate commerce, but not wanting Congress’ power
to go too far).
112. See id. at 255 (noting that the first prong of the two-prong test is to ensure that the
activity in question is commercial).
113. See id. at 255-58 (describing an activity that will significantly affect commerce includes
discrimination of African Americans when it limits their ability to travel throughout the
country).
114. See Heart of Atlanta Motel, 379 U.S. at 243-44 (determining the validity of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 enacted pursuant to the Commerce Clause). The case was brought by an
appellant who claimed that the statute’s Title II requirement that public accommodations serve
African Americans was a taking of the appellant’s liberty and property without due process. Id.
115. See id. at 258 (believing that in order to sustain the legislation, the Court needs to find
Congress had a rational reason for finding that racial discriminations by motels affected
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the Court would need to find that the discrimination in question
affected commerce and that the means employed by Congress to
116
eliminate the discrimination were reasonable and appropriate.
Reviewing the legislative history of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the
Court found ample evidence of the burdens racial discrimination
117
With this evidence, the Court declared
placed upon commerce.
that the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was a valid act of Congress’
118
commerce power.
The ADA is a valid exercise of Congress’ commerce power for a
number of reasons. To begin with, the Court would need to examine
the statute’s legislative findings which demonstrate how
discrimination against people with disabilities has led to the denial of
various opportunities for such individuals and in turn substantially
affected interstate commerce.119
Congress stated in section
12101(a)(8) of the ADA that there is a need to ensure that
individuals with disabilities enjoy equality of opportunities, full
participation in all areas of society, and the ability to become
economically self-sufficient.120 Congress also took note of the various
statistics compiled that documented the fact that people with
disabilities are severely disadvantaged not only by the fact that they
occupy an inferior status within our society, but also because they are
121
economically, socially, vocationally, and educationally deprived.
Finally, Congress expressed in its findings that the discrimination
against people with disabilities costs the United States billions of
dollars in unnecessary expenses resulting from dependency and
nonproductivity.122
commerce).
116. See id. (stating that it was not sufficient for the Court to simply find that Congress had a
rational reason for the statute in question; the Court also needed to find that the means
Congress selected to eliminate the wrongs in question were rational and proper).
117. See id. at 252-53, 257 (citing that such burdens included the fact that in a time when
people are increasingly mobile, African Americans must travel further to secure the same
accommodations as others and that such discrimination has had a significant impact upon
commerce).
118. See id. at 261 (holding that the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is a reasonable and valid act of
congressional power even when it may be argued that Congress could have employed other
methods to eliminate the discrimination it found obstructing interstate commerce).
119. Cf. Hodel, 452 U.S. at 276 (noting that the Court must look to the legislative findings of
a statute to determine if Congress possessed a rational reason for finding that a certain activity
affected interstate commerce).
120. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(8) (1994) (listing the nation’s goals for mainstreaming
individuals with disabilities).
121. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(6) (stating characteristics of the disabled population acquired
as a result of discrimination that has affected the national economy).
122. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(9) (citing the costs pertaining to people with disabilities as a
result of their lack of access to equal opportunities).
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However, there is no requirement that a court be bound to only
review the congressional findings of a statute in order to determine a
rational basis for the statute.123 Additionally, a court may also look to
the evidence reported within the legislative history of a statute.124 The
ADA has a lengthy legislative history that supports its enactment
125
under Congress’ Commerce Clause authority.
In its report regarding the need for the ADA, the Senate’s
Committee on Labor and Human Resources attempted to explain
through excerpts of various individual testimonies that the
discrimination faced by people with disabilities affects not only almost
126
every aspect of their own lives, but also the country at large. This
discrimination reduced individuals with disabilities to believing that
they are second-class citizens who have been stripped of all feelings of
pride and dignity.127 Such discrimination has also led to individuals
fearing future discrimination, thus growing reluctant to participate in
128
programs and becoming socially isolated.
As a result of these actions and feelings, the committee found that
a large number of individuals with disabilities are dependent upon
social welfare programs costing the government and taxpayers at that
129
Moreover, the disabled
time billions of unnecessary dollars.
population produced a large and talented workforce that could no
130
longer be ignored. Therefore, the passage of the ADA would bring
direct and tangible benefits for the country.131 With more individuals
123. See Heart of Atlanta Motel., 379 U.S. at 252 (explaining that while the Civil Rights Act of
1964 included no congressional findings, it was sufficient for the Court to examine the evidence
found within the legislative history of the Act to determine Congress’ reasoning for the statute’s
enactment).
124. See Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 299, 304 (1964) (finding that Congress’
evidence of the need for the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was sufficient by itself to reasonably
conclude that racial discrimination affected commerce).
125. See Garrett, 193 F.3d at 1218 (recognizing the extensive legislative findings prepared by
Congress before the passing of the ADA); Coolbaugh v. State of La., 136 F.3d 430, 438 (5th Cir.
1998) (noting the wide-range of congressional findings and evidence Congress incorporated
within the ADA); Martin v. Kansas, 190 F.3d 1120, 1126-28 (10th Cir. 1999) (observing the
various findings Congress made regarding pervasive discrimination of people with disabilities
when enacting the ADA).
126. See S. REP. NO. 101-116, at 16 (1989) (emphasizing that discrimination harms all
people with disabilities).
127. See id. (explaining how discrimination scars individuals for life).
128. See id. (taking note that some individuals with disabilities who were isolated from
society committed suicide as a result).
129. See id. at 17 (statement of President George Bush) (reporting that at the time the ADA
was enacted, the country was spending more than sixty billion dollars on disability benefits and
programs per year).
130. See id. (recognizing the various abilities of the large disability population that have
gone unnoticed).
131. See S. REP. NO. 101-116, at 17 (statement of Attorney General Thornburgh) (stating
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with disabilities able to work, fewer would be dependent upon the
country’s Social Security system and more individuals would have the
ability to spend their money on consumer goods as well as increasing
132
tax revenues through their employment. This evidence clearly
supports the notion that the further integrated individuals with
disabilities are within society, the less interstate commerce will be
affected by their segregation. Therefore, this is a legitimate reason
for Congress to invoke its Commerce Clause authority in order to
pass the ADA.133
However, the analysis of the ADA’s validity under Congress’
Commerce Clause power is not complete without discussing United
States v. Lopez and United States v. Morrison, two recent cases in which
the Supreme Court struck down statutes Congress passed pursuant to
134
its Commerce Clause authority. In Lopez, while reviewing whether a
high school student could be federally convicted under the Gun-Free
School Zone Act for carrying a gun to school, the Court determined
that the statute extended beyond the powers of Congress’ Commerce
Clause because the activity it regulated did not have any substantial
connection to commerce.135
The Court’s role in Lopez was to determine if the activity regulated
by the Gun-Free School Zone Act could substantially and reasonably
136
affect commerce; the Court held that it could not. First, the Court
found that the section of the statute in question was actually a
137
criminal statute having nothing to do with commerce. Second, the
Court could not find a jurisdictional element within the act that a
firearm could possibly affect commerce.138 Finally, the Court declined
to believe that the statute in question was justified under the
that the passage of comprehensive civil rights legislation will lead to the elimination of
employment discrimination and the mainstreaming of individuals with disabilities).
132. See id. at 17 (asserting that discrimination increases people’s dependency upon social
welfare programs rather than allowing them to be taxpayers and consumers).
133. Cf. Heart of Atlanta Motel, 379 U.S. at 252-53 (holding that the Civil Rights Act of 1964
was a legitimate act of Congress’ Commerce Clause power when the Court found evidence of
how racial discrimination affects interstate commerce within the Act’s legislative history).
134. See Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567-68 (1995) (holding that the Gun-Free School Zone Act was
an invalid act of Congress under its Commerce Clause authority); United States v. Morrison,
529 U.S. at 617-18 (rejecting the idea that Congress could regulate violent acts towards women
solely because such actions have an aggregate effect on interstate commerce).
135. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 551-52 (confirming the fact that Congress can regulate an action
under the Commerce Clause only if the action substantially affects interstate commerce).
136. See id. at 561-62 (citing the reasons the statute violated the Commerce Clause).
137. See id. at 561 (reasoning that the criminal statute had no effect on economic
enterprise).
138. See id. at 561-62 (finding that the statute lacked any jurisdictional element that would
narrow its focus upon a specific set of firearms which might have adverse effects on commerce).
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Commerce Clause due to the fact that no legislative history or
findings accompanied the statute to express the regulated activities’
139
affect on commerce.
In addition, the Lopez Court also rejected the idea of Congress’
being able to “pile inference upon inference” in order to justify the
140
For example, Justice
effects guns in schools have on commerce.
Breyer argued in his dissent that guns found in schools affect the
learning environment and education students receive, which in turn
will produce a less educated society and have substantial effects upon
141
However, the majority rejected this type of
the economy.
reasoning, believing that if it was accepted there would be no activity
that Congress could not regulate through claims that it in some way
affected commerce.142
When the Court examined whether the Violence Against Women
143
Act (“VAWA”) was a valid act of Congress pursuant to the
Commerce Clause in United States v. Morrison, the Court analyzed
whether the act met the same standards established by the Justices in
Lopez.144 Similar to Lopez, the Court found VAWA to be a criminal
statute possessing little or no relation to economic activity,145 and
lacking a jurisdictional element that would support the fact that the
statute was regulating an activity that had some impact upon
interstate commerce.146 However, the Court did recognize that unlike
the Gun-Free School Zone Act, VAWA was supported by numerous
Congressional findings regarding the impact that gender-motivated
violence had upon victims and their families.147 Yet, the Court

139. See id. at 552 (explaining that although legislative findings are not required to sustain
an act, they are helpful when the Court needs to assess Congress’ reasoning behind enacting a
statute).
140. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567 (arguing that Congress’ reasoning regarding guns’ effect on
commerce was insufficient since it relied upon inferences and speculation, instead of the facts).
141. See id. at 619 (Breyer, J., with whom Stevens, Souter, and Ginsberg, JJ., join, dissenting)
(explaining how guns in schools have a direct effect upon education, producing a lowereducated society that will affect the capabilities of a growing economy).
142. See id. at 564 (arguing that if the Court was to accept reasoning based upon inferences,
there would be no end to Congress’ power to regulate activities).
143. 42 U.S.C.A. § 13981.
144. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 608-13 (reviewing precedent established in Lopez to interpret
the Violence Against Women Act (“VAWA”), a statute aimed at eliminating gender motivated
violence).
145. See id. at 612 (rejecting the idea that gender-motivated violence affects economic
activities).
146. See id. (finding that without a jurisdictional element, there is no evidence of a
relationship between gender-motivated violence and interstate commerce).
147. See id. at 614 (reviewing the legislative history of VAWA and recognizing that Congress
did produce evidence regarding the effects of gender-motivated violence on commerce).
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believed that these findings alone were not sufficient to sustain the
148
The Court noted that Congress’ findings were based
legislation.
upon reasoning that was previously rejected in Lopez.149 Congress
argued in its legislative findings supporting VAWA, that victims of
violence were less likely to travel, be employed, and transact business all activities which in some form affect interstate commerce by
diminishing national productivity and decreasing the supply and
demand for interstate products.150 The Court rejected this argument,
labeling it a “but-for causal chain.”151 If accepted, there would be no
limits to Congress’ power and would eventually lead to a complete
152
suppression of the states’ policing power.
Applying the standards established in Lopez and Morrison, it is clear
that the ADA is a valid act of Congress pursuant to its Commerce
Clause power. As noted above, the ADA was accompanied by varying
evidence including testimonies, statistics, and facts, regarding the
effect of discrimination against people with disabilities on interstate
commerce.153 Thus, it is clear that the ADA regulates activities that
are an “essential part of a larger regulation of economic activity.”154
The only problem with arguing that the ADA meets the standards
expressed within Lopez is that Title II of the statute does not explicitly
possess a jurisdictional element, unlike Titles I and III.155 However, it
is not necessary for Congress to establish an interstate nexus in every
156
As long as Congress is able to
application of the statute.
demonstrate that the regulated activities substantially affect interstate

148. See id. (quoting Justice Rehnquist who stated “simply because Congress may conclude
that a particular activity substantially affects interstate commerce does not necessarily make it
so” in Hodel., 252 U.S. at 311 (citing Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, n.2 (1995))).
149. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 614 (declaring that legislative findings based on inferences are
invalid); see also Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561 (rejecting findings that required inferences to be
compiled together to establish a connection).
150. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 615 (citing H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 103-711, at 385 (1994)
(explaining the effects of violence against women upon commerce).
151. See id. (recognizing that the acceptance of this reasoning would allow Congress to use
its Commerce Clause power to obliterate the Constitution’s distinctions between national and
local authority).
152. See id. (reiterating the need for separation between state powers and federal powers).
153. See S. REP. NO. 101-116, at 5-21 (reviewing the need for legislation that combated
discrimination against the disabled).
154. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561 (invalidating the Gun-Free School Zone Act because it did not
regulate an activity which was essential to the larger economy).
155. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111(5)(A), 12181(1) (requiring the ADA to be enforced against
businesses and public accommodations that affect commerce).
156. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 612 (interpreting the holding in Lopez as stating that a
jurisdictional element only lends support to an argument that a statute in question regulates an
activity that is substantially tied to commerce).
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157

commerce, the ADA should be sustained.
Finally, although Lopez and Morrison are the Supreme Court’s most
recent cases examining Congress’ Commerce Clause authority, they
can be distinguished significantly from any cases questioning the
158
While both the Gun-Free School
constitutionality of the ADA.
Zone Act and VAWA are statutes that clearly deal with regulating
159
criminal conduct, the ADA is purely a civil rights statute. Any case
dealing with the constitutionality of the ADA will be more closely
related to the Supreme Court’s analysis of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
than it will the Court’s examination of the Gun-Free School Zone Act
or VAWA.160 Moreover, the Seventh Circuit in United States v. Wilson161
took note of the fact that the Supreme Court’s ruling in Lopez was not
meant to be a complete departure from established Commerce
Clause precedent, evidenced by the fact that the Court relied on
precedent to render its decision.162
B. Future of Discrimination Suits Filed under the ADA
1.

Private Individuals’ Suits

Assuming that the ADA is constitutional under the Commerce
Clause, the only way an individual can bring a suit in an employment
action against a state is if it is a suit for injunctive relief against a state
163
164
The 1908 decision rendered in Ex parte Young enabling
official.
an individual to sue a state official for injunctive relief, despite the
Eleventh Amendment, is still recognized by the Supreme Court

157. Cf. id. at 610 (recognizing that Lopez’s review of Commerce Clause jurisprudence
indicates that a statute will be sustained as long as it has substantial affects on interstate
commerce) (citing Lopez, 514 U.S. at 549).
158. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 551 (examining the constitutionality of the Gun-Free School Zone
Act); Morrison, 529 U.S. at 601-02 (interpreting VAWA).
159. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 922(q) (1998 ed., Supp. V) (making it a federal offense for a
student to carry a firearm into a school zone), and 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (1994) (providing remedy
for gender motivated violence), with 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (1994) (prohibiting discrimination
against individuals with disabilities by private and public entities).
160. See Heart of Atlanta Motel., 379 U.S. at 245 (reviewing the Civil Rights Act of 1964).
161. 73 F.3d 675 (7th Cir. 1995).
162. See id. at 685 (using the Supreme Court’s analysis in Lopez as well as Commerce Clause
jurisprudence to rule that the Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act was a valid act of
Congress’ Commerce Clause power).
163. See Seminole Tribe of Fla., 517 U.S. at 72-73 (stating that a state’s Eleventh Amendment
rights cannot be abrogated by Congress under Article I); Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 68
(1985) (recognizing the one exception to a state’s Eleventh Amendment immunity is when a
suit is brought to challenge the constitutionality of a state official’s actions).
164. 219 U.S. 123, 165 (1908) (analyzing what the appropriate remedy is for a case seeking
injunctive relief from a state entity).
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165
When determining whether the Attorney General of the
today.
State of Minnesota discriminated against railroad companies when he
166
lowered the tariff railroads could charge passengers, the Supreme
Court ruled that the Attorney General could be held liable for the
167
The Court found no Eleventh
state’s unconstitutional actions.
Amendment issues implicated when a suit was simply seeking
injunctive relief against a state official whose conduct was
unconstitutional.168 Moreover, the Court declared that when relief is
being sought for a constitutional violation, a state cannot “[i]mpart to
the official immunity from responsibility to the supreme authority of
the United States.”169
Yet, a plaintiff’s suit against a state official for injunctive relief
cannot be against a state agency or entity associated with the state.170
In addition, the suit cannot include a request for any type of
damages.171 In the case Edelman v. Jordan,172 the Court attempted to
create a distinction between the types of equitable relief sought in Ex
173
The Court
parte Young and the relief sought in the case at hand.
did recognize that its reasoning behind this distinction was somewhat
contradictory since most injunctive relief courts render affect the
treasury of a state in some form.174 Subsequently, the Court also made
it clear that any relief granted under this Eleventh Amendment

165. See Seminole Tribe of Fla., 517 U.S. at 73 (commenting on petitioner’s reliance on the
Court’s Ex parte Young precedent).
166. See Young, 209 U.S. at 144 (stating the issue and holding of the case).
167. See id. at 168 (explaining that it is valid to bring a suit against the Attorney General of a
state to prevent him from enforcing a statute that violates the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due
Process Clause).
168. See id. at 166-67 (holding that the only appropriate form of relief for the railroad
companies is to seek a bill of chancery or equity).
169. Id. at 167 (remarking how an individual working on behalf of a state cannot defend
himself with state immunity).
170. See Puerto Rico Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 146
(1993) (stating that Ex parte Young is only to be viewed as a narrow exception to the Eleventh
Amendment).
171. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 666-67 (1974) (holding that a suit requesting
retroactive benefits will not mean disbursements based on equity).
172. See id. at 653 (arising out of the claim that the federal state programs, such as Aid to the
Aged, Blind or Disabled (“AABD”) were administered inconsistently according to the
Fourteenth Amendment).
173. See id. at 667-68 (explaining that the type of relief sought in the case at bar was a form
of compensation, similar to any other award of damages, requiring the state to pay the reward
from its general revenues; whereas the relief sought in Ex parte Young only required the
Attorney General of Minnesota to conform his future conduct to the principles of the
Fourteenth Amendment).
174. See id. at 667 (noting that the Court has authorized equitable relief in cases that have
had great impacts upon a state’s treasury, such as its ruling in Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S.
365 (1971), when state officials were enjoined from denying welfare benefits to legal aliens).
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175
exception to violations of federal law can only be in the form of
176
prospective relief and cannot be used to cure past violations.

2.

Suits Brought By the United States Government

In addition to suits filed by individuals in hopes of obtaining
injunctive relief against the actions of state officials, the United States
Government can bring suit on behalf of one or more individuals
against a state for a violation of the ADA.177 Mostly through the work
of the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) and the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”), claims can be brought against
states for all types of compensation, and a state cannot declare itself
178
immune under the Eleventh Amendment.
However, it is important to understand that due to insufficient
resources, it is almost impossible for federal agencies to prosecute
179
Often
every case of discrimination that is brought to them.
agencies are forced to limit the work they perform, such as only
pursuing those cases that will have an effect on the lives of numerous
individuals.180
175. See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 106 (1984) (ruling that
the Young exception would be inappropriate if applied to state law, since such an application
would be in direct conflict with the principles of Federalism).
176. See Green, 474 U.S. at 73 (holding that since there is no evidence of continuing
violations in determining the eligibility of Aid to Family with Dependent Children (“AFDC”)
benefits, there is no need to issue an injunction). Moreover, the Eleventh Amendment would
bar the Court from issuing relief for past violations. Id.
177. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 756 (1999) (declaring that, “[i]n ratifying the
Constitution, the States consented to suits brought by other States or by the Federal
Government”); see also Erickson v. Bd. of Governors of State College & Univ. for Northeastern
Ill., 207 F.3d 945, 951 (7th Cir. 2000) (recognizing that while the Eleventh Amendment
prevents litigation by private citizens enforcing the ADA in federal courts, it does not bar the
United States from enforcing the ADA against states through federal litigation) (citing West
Virginia v. United States, 479 U.S. 305, 311 n.4 (1987)).
178. See United States v. Mississippi, 380 U.S. 128, 140 (1965) (explaining that no case has
ever suggested that the United States government could not institute proceedings against a
state in order to protect the constitutional rights of citizens). The Court further noted that
nothing could be found in the Eleventh Amendment or the Constitution that prevented a state
from being sued by the federal government. Id.
179. See NATIONAL COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, PROMISES TO KEEP: A DECADE OF FEDERAL
ENFORCEMENT OF THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT 37 (June 27, 2000) (explaining that
with more resources DOJ could open more ADA cases for investigation and litigation).
Moreover, due to the fact that the EEOC did not receive an addition to its budget in real dollars
until Fiscal Year 1999 to enforce the ADA, it has been difficult for the agency to take on all its
ADA claims. Id. at 155. But see Geraldine Sealey, Disabilities Act A Decade Later, ABCNEWS.COM
(July 26, 2000), at http:///www.abcnews.go.com/sections/us/DailyNews/ada000726.html
(reporting that President Clinton had announced an initiative to address the lack of resources
dedicated to the enforcement of the ADA). The President called for an additional 2.4 million
dollars, to the current 10.8 million dollar budget, in the fiscal year 2001 budget. Id.
180. Cf. 42 U.S.C. § 12188(B) (granting the Attorney General the authority to seek redress
in cases where a person or entity is engaged in a pattern of practice of discrimination, or in
cases of general public importance).
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C. Other Disability Laws
If an individual is unable to bring suit against a state for a violation
of the ADA because s/he seeks more than injunctive relief, or a
federal agency is unable to bring suit on his/her behalf, then the only
option remaining for the individual is to sue the state under the
state’s disability laws.181 While all fifty states have some type of law
protecting individuals with disabilities from discrimination,
particularly in employment settings, many state laws simply are not as
comprehensive as the ADA.182 For example, although most states
require employers to make reasonable accommodations for
employees with disabilities as long as it would not unduly burden the
employer, six states have no such requirement at all.183 On the other
hand, some states simply limit the costs that employers are required
to incur when accommodating employees.184
Moreover, the types of disabilities that are covered by state laws are
185
Whereas the ADA not only protects those who are
not uniform.
disabled but also individuals who are treated and viewed by others as
186
being disabled, only thirty-four states protect those individuals who
have no current impairment but rather a history of one or are
187
In addition, not all state laws allow an
regarded as having one.
individual to bring a disability claim directly to a court of law.188 Some
states require individuals to exhaust all administrative remedies
189
first; other states only provide an individual with an administrative
181. See Brief for Petitioners, 2000 WL 821035, *4-*6, Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett,
121 S. Ct. 955 (arguing that Alabama laws are sufficient to adequately protect individuals with
disabilities from discrimination by all entities including state agencies).
182. See State Statutes Prohibiting Discrimination on the Basis of Disability, [1996] ADA Employees
Rights and Employers Obligations (MB) ¶ 10.1 (June 1996) (explaining the similarities and
differences of state disability laws that protect against employment discrimination).
183. See id. ¶ 10.2 (citing Alabama, Georgia, Nevada, New Hampshire, New York, and
Tennessee as states that do not require employers to reasonably accommodate employees with
disabilities).
184. See id. (finding North Carolina and Michigan to be two examples of states limiting the
costs employers are required to spend on accommodating individuals with disabilities).
185. See id. at n.3 (explaining that while most states cover individuals with physical and
mental disabilities, states such as Alabama, Arizona and Mississippi protect only individuals with
physical disabilities).
186. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (1994) (defining the term disability to include individuals with
a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of their major life
activities; persons who have a record of such impairment; or individuals who are regarded by
others as having such an impairment).
187. See State Statutes Prohibiting Discrimination on the Basis of Disability, [1996] ADA Employees
Rights and Employers Obligations (MB) ¶ 10.2 (describing the differences in the types of
individuals that can be covered under state disability laws).
188. See id. (finding that some states require individuals to seek relief through
administrative or mediation procedures before appealing to the court system).
189. See id. § 10-3 (explaining the difference in enforcement procedures among the states).
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remedy and do not enable individuals to bring their claims into state
190
court at all. Finally, although all states provide for back pay and loss
of compensation as a form of relief to individuals who successfully
pursue their claims, not all states allow for the recovery of attorney’s
fees, unlike a provision for relief under the ADA.191
D. Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973
The last option available to an individual who is discriminated
against on the basis of his/her disability is to bring suit under section
192
This option can only be
504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.
pursued if the individual is discriminated against in a program that
receives federal financial assistance or is conducted by an Executive
Agency or the United States Postal Service.193 In addition to
questioning the constitutionality of the ADA, the petitioners in Garrett
also presented the Court with the question of the constitutionality of
section 504.194 Even though the Supreme Court has declined to grant
certiorari on that issue at the present time, there is no way to predict
195
what effect the ruling in Garrett may have on the Rehabilitation Act.
III. EFFECTS UPON THE STATES HAD THE COURT UPHELD THE
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE ADA
A. The Foundations of Sovereign Immunity
Although the ruling by the Supreme Court in Garrett invalidating
the ADA will have severe consequences for the disability community,
it is clear that, had the Court ruled in favor of the ADA, there would
have been a great impact upon this country’s system of Federalism

190. See id. (finding that some states only provide individuals with administrative remedies
with limited or no judicial review when attempting to protect their rights).
191. See id. (stating that in only twenty-two states are individuals able to recovery
compensatory damages when pursuing their claim, and the amount of damages can be limited
in a number of states); see also 42 U.S.C. § 12205 (1994) (enabling a court presiding over a claim
brought under the ADA the authority to grant the prevailing party recovery of attorney’s fees).
192. See 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1994) (prohibiting qualified individuals with disabilities from
being discriminated against or excluded from federal programs solely on the basis of their
disabilities).
193. See id. §§ 794(a), 794(b)(1)(B) (defining federally funded programs to extend to
various programs and activities including state and local government programs that receive
federal assistance in order to operate).
194. See Garrett, 193 F.3d 1214 (1999) cert. granted, Garrett, 120 S. Ct. 1669 (2000) (presenting
the question of whether a state waives its Eleventh Amendment immunity when it accepts
federal financial assistance that Congress conditioned upon a waiver).
195. See Garrett, 121 S. Ct. at 960 (examining only the constitutionality of Title I as it is
applies to state governments).
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196
and the future of states’ rights. The basic idea behind Federalism is
that there is an equal division of power between the national
197
One major
government and state and local governments.
underlying principle of Federalism is that states are sovereign from
198
the federal government, thus free to govern the activities that take
place within their jurisdiction by their own will.199 As a result of the
Eleventh Amendment, this sovereignty also extends to a state’s ability
to declare itself immune to any action “commenced or prosecuted
against one of the United States.”200 Yet, as the Supreme Court
recognized in Alden v. Maine, this immunity is not confined by the
201
It is recognized as a
terms of the Eleventh Amendment.
fundamental aspect of the idea of sovereignty that is visible
throughout the structure of the Constitution.202
Sovereign immunity originated in feudal England when
landowners maintained their own courts and could hear or refuse
203
This notion of
any case brought against them within their court.
control remained in the English government for centuries and
became a great concern for the states after the Revolutionary War,
when this nation was forming.204 Recognizing the states’ fear,

196. See Brief for Petitioners, 2000 WL 821359, *1,Garrett, 121 S. Ct. 955 (arguing the need
to protect the sovereign immunity of the states against unwarranted Congressional intrusion in
order to maintain the balance of Federalism).
197. See OTIS H. STEPHENS JR. & JOHN M. SCHEB, II, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 386
(1993) (contrasting the dramatic changes in the relationship between state and national
government since this country began, despite states still maintaining a substantial source of
power).
198. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 714 (1999) (declaring that the ways in which the
federal system preserves the sovereign status of the states include: (1) reserving a substantial
source of the Nation’s primary sovereignty to the states, thus making the states no more
accountable to the federal government than the federal government is to them; (2) designing
the government in such a way that it establishes a non-centralized structure where state and
federal government have concurrent authority).
199. See Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 415 (1979) (referring to a state’s sovereign immunity
as a state’s right to govern itself).
200. See Alden, 527 U.S. at 722 (referencing the foundations of state sovereign immunity)
(quoting U.S. CONST. amend. XI).
201. See id. at 713 (recognizing that the idea of sovereign immunity is not derived from the
Eleventh Amendment).
202. See id. (finding that state’s immunity was recognized long before the ratification of the
Constitution and is retained today).
203. See Camille Gearhart, Note, Confronting the Fictions of the Eleventh Amendment: Pennhurst
State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 60 WASH. L. REV. 407, 410 n.20 (1985) (establishing
that while landlords were immune to suits within their own court, they were not immune to
suits of superior sovereigns); see also Nevada, 440 U.S. at 414-15 (recounting that the immunity
doctrine was established in common law where petty lords could only be subject to suits of lords
in higher courts, a system that left the King almost completely immune).
204. See Hall, 440 U.S. at 418 (describing how states were vitally interested in whether the
creation of a sovereign federal government would have the power to subject them to suits
similar to the way lower English lords were subjected to suits of higher lords).
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Alexander Hamilton addressed some of these concerns in the
Federalist Papers, in which he established the notion that no state
should be amenable to any suit brought by an individual without the
205
Hamilton’s idea is repeatedly recognized
state’s prior consent.
206
throughout the years, in addition to being relied upon when the
Eleventh Amendment was enacted.207 Furthermore, it was this idea of
Hamilton’s which became the foundation for the Supreme Court to
extend the interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment beyond its
literal meaning in order to allow a state to prohibit suits brought by
its own citizens.208
B. Effects of Abrogating the States’ Eleventh Amendment
Had the Court allowed Congress to possess the authority to
abrogate the states’ Eleventh Amendment protection, the primary
goals behind Federalism and state sovereignty would have been
209
compromised. States would no longer be able to control aspects of
their sovereignty when Congress grants private individuals the ability
210
to sue states in federal courts. Consequently, not only would states
be forced to pay federal court judgments out of their own treasury,211
but they would also be forced to participate in the “coercive process

205. See THE FEDERALIST No. 81 (Alexander Hamilton) (writing that to hold a state
accountable in suits they have not consented to would be counterproductive and would be as if
one were “waging war against the contracting State”).
206. See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 98 (1984) (establishing
the fact that, “a state may not be sued without its consent is a fundamental rule of jurisprudence
having so important a bearing on the construction of the Constitution of the United States that
it has become established by repeated decisions of this court . . . .”) (quoting Ex parte State of
N.Y. No. 8, 256 U.S. 490, 497 (1921)); Hall, 440 U.S. at 416 (supporting the idea that no
sovereign state can be sued in its own courts without its consent); Alden, 527 U.S. at 716
(reconfirming the universally accepted doctrine that no state could be subjected to a suit
without its expressed consent since this immunity is an essential part of a sovereign’s dignity).
207. See Alden, 527 U.S. at 719 (recounting how the Eleventh Amendment was enacted after
the Supreme Court had ruled that Article III of the Constitution authorized a private citizen of
another State to sue the state of Georgia without its consent) (citing Chisolm v. Georgia, 2 U.S.
419 (1793)). The decision created such outrage within the country, especially for the states, that
just one day later an initial proposal to amend the Constitution was introduced into the House
of Representative. Id. at 720-21.
208. See id. at 727 (stating that in Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890), the Supreme Court
made the determination that “sovereign immunity barred a citizen from suing his own State
under federal-question . . . jurisdiction”).
209. See Seminole Tribe of Fla., 517 U.S. at 59 (recognizing that granting Congress the power
to abrogate the states’ Eleventh Amendment Rights expanding federal power at the expense of
the states).
210. See Alden, 527 U.S. at 713 (clarifying that a state’s immunity is a fundamental aspect of
its sovereignty).
211. See Hess v. Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp., 513 U.S. 30, 48 (1994) (explaining that the
Courts of Appeals have found a state’s purse to be one of the most salient factors in Eleventh
Amendment determinations).
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212
Suits
of judicial tribunals at the instance of private parties.”
brought by private individuals would require states to spend large
amounts of time and resources to justify actions that some argue
should be presumed legal.213
Furthermore, numerous suits
questioning states’ practices would discourage states from taking on
new initiatives that could provide for their most vulnerable
populations.214
Moreover, it would be argued that it is beyond Congress’ authority,
under the principles of Federalism, to be legislating the ways in which
215
In fact, some
states should protect and provide for their citizens.
would argue that not only did Congress overstep its boundary by
mandating how the disabled are to be treated, but legislation such as
the ADA has placed huge burdens upon the states that are not
proportionate with its benefits.216
In addition, the federal
government has not even tried to lessen the burden or its
encroachment by providing the states with money to assist in the
implementation of the ADA.217 The ADA mandates that all people
with disabilities be mainstreamed in all areas of a state’s
218
Yet at the same time, the law disregards the lack of
jurisdiction.
resources available to a state as well as a state’s judgment for how to
appropriately meet the needs of its disabled population.219

212. Puerto Rico Aqueduct & Sewer Auth., 506 U.S. at 146 (observing that the states possess
certain attributes of sovereignty according them with the respect owed to them as members of a
federation (citing In re Ayers, 123 U.S. 443, 505 (1887))).
213. See Hawaii, Arkansas, Idaho, Nebraska, Nevada, Ohio and Tennessee Amici Curiae for
Petitioners, 2000 WL 821359, *18, Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. in Birmingham v. Garrett, 121 S.
Ct. 955 (arguing that requiring states to put resources into litigation costs and damages awards
compromises states’ ability to provide services to citizens).
214. See id. (noting the millions of dollars that lawsuits by private individuals cost the states,
thus preventing them from spending their money more efficiently).
215. See id. at *8 (contending that Congress’ authority to pass the ADA was incorrect
because there was no evidence of states mistreating their disabled population or
unconstitutionally discriminating against them).
216. See Marci Hamilton, The High Cost of Look-Good, Feel-Good Legislation CNN.COM (July 26,
2000), at http://www.cnn.com.2000/LAW/07/columns/fl/hamilton.ada.07.26/ (referring to
the fact that although the ADA is costing the states large amounts of money, states have not yet
resisted since representatives are afraid of projecting poor public images by opposing the
assistance to the disabled).
217. See id. (reporting how the ADA forces states to mainstream individuals with disabilities
in the most expensive manner and does not provide any federal funds to pay for the increased
costs).
218. See 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(d) (requiring entities to provide programs in the most
integrated setting possible to meet the needs of the individuals with disabilities). But see
Olmstead., 527 U.S. at 607 (declaring that while states should attempt to place individuals with
mental disabilities in community-based settings, one must take into account a state’s resources
and the number and needs of other individuals with mental disabilities in the state).
219. See Hamilton, supra note 216, at http://www.cnn.com/2000/LAW/07/columns/fl/
hamilton.ada.07.26/ (referring to how the ADA applies to all aspects of a state, from how
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The Eleventh Amendment’s primary purpose is to preserve the
sovereignty of the states and reaffirm the promises implicitly made
within the Constitution’s Tenth Amendment.220 However, allowing
Congress to enact legislation such as the ADA would prevent states
from making their own decisions and running their governments
independently, as well as seriously alter the fundamental structure of
the Constitution.221
CONCLUSION
The decision the Supreme Court rendered in Board of Trustees of
University of Alabama in Birmingham v. Garrett is likely to have sweeping
affects for individuals with disabilities. While after ten years there
have been significant advances towards accomplishing the ADA’s
222
main goals, many individuals with disabilities continue to be
isolated and segregated from society.223 For example, only three out
of ten individuals with disabilities of working age are employed in full
or part-time jobs, even though two out every three individuals with
disabilities who are unemployed would actually prefer to work.224 As a
result of this lower rate of employment for people with disabilities,
such individuals are more likely to live in poverty with household
incomes of $15,000 a year or less.225 In addition to experiencing
individuals are treated in hospitals and schools, to how they are treated in prisons).
220. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 713 (1999) (noting that the Eleventh Amendment is
seen as simply restating the terms within the Tenth Amendment); see also U.S. CONST. amend. X
(stating, “[t]he powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited
by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people”).
221. See Hawaii, Arkansas, Idaho, Nebraska, Nevada, Ohio and Tennessee Amici Curiae
Brief for Petitioners, 2000 WL 821359, *18,Garrett, 121 S. Ct. 955 (2001) (arguing that Congress
was violating the rights of the states when enacting the ADA). As a result of the ADA, states
have been relegated to the status of governmental province in a federal system. Id.
222. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1)-(2) (1994) (setting comprehensive standards to ensure the
end of discrimination against people with disabilities); Hill, supra note 25, at 17A (stating that
progress has been made in achieving the goals of the ADA). Such goals include granting
individuals with disabilities more freedom to choose where to live and greater opportunities to
pursue their aspirations. Id.
223. See Survey Program in Participation and Attitudes: The 2000 N.O.D. Harris Survey of
Americans With Disabilities (July 29, 2000), at http://www.nod.org/hs2000.html (examining the
discrepancies between people with disabilities and people without disabilities in various areas
including employment, education, household income, access to transportation, socialization,
political participation, and life satisfaction).
224. See id. at http://www.nod.org/hs2000.html (comparing statistics of individuals with
disabilities to individuals without and finding that eight out of ten individuals without
disabilities who are of working age are employed). In other words, eighty-one percent of the
non-disabled population is working, compared with only thirty-two percent of the disabled
population. Id.
225. See id. at http://www.nod.org/hs2000.html (estimating only ten percent of the nondisabled population to live in poverty, in comparison with twenty-nine percent of the disabled
population).
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problems in the area of employment, people with disabilities also
226
have lower participation rates in areas of education and voting.
Understandably, it is unrealistic to believe that in just ten years the
227
ADA could achieve its primary objectives. However, with the ruling
in Garrett, the Supreme Court is prohibiting further implementation
of the ADA, and it is unlikely that all individuals with disabilities will
ever find themselves fully integrated within society.228 In many
instances, not only will individuals find themselves segregated as
result of discrimination, but individuals will be unable to protect
themselves and ensure their rights.229 Without the ADA, it will be
significantly more difficult for individuals to seek redress for
discriminatory acts resulting from their disabilities.230
Presently in the United States, there are more than fifty-seven
231
million individuals with some form of disability. Some even argue
that the disabled population constitutes the largest minority within
232
this country. Regardless of these contentions, one thing is true: this
group is the only minority that anyone can join at any point in their
233
life. Considering this compelling point, the ADA is perhaps one of
the most important pieces of modern legislation in this country.

226. See id. at http://www.nod.org/hs2000.html (finding that more than one out of five
individuals with disabilities fails to complete high school, while only one out of ten persons with
disabilities are able to graduate from college). In addition, reviewing statistics from the 1996
Presidential Election, it is clear that people with disabilities are not engaged in the political
process to the same extent as people without disabilities. Id. Specifically, only sixty-two percent
of the disabled population was registered to vote, compared to seventy-eight percent of the nondisabled population. Id.
227. See Hill, supra note 25, at 17A (declaring that the ADA was just a beginning and that
more time is needed before the disabled community reaches its ultimate goal of full integration
of individuals with disabilities into society).
228. See id. (reporting that if the Supreme Court holds the ADA to be unconstitutional when
applied to the states, then states will discriminate without penalty).
229. See id. (noting that if the ADA is invalidated, society will retreat to one of segregation,
fear and dependence for people with disabilities).
230. Cf. Don’t Let States Discriminate Series: Editorials, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Jan. 31, 2000, at
8A (recognizing the Court is slowly limiting Congress’ ability to advance the civil rights of
individuals).
231. See Mary Leonard, Disability Act’s Progress, Limits Marked, BOSTON GLOBE, July 14, 2000,
at A1 (reporting the number of individuals with disabilities currently in the United States).
232. See JOSEPH SHAPIRO, NO PITY 7 (1993) (arguing that when including individuals with
learning disabilities, mental illness, and various diseases such as cancer, the number of
individuals with disabilities reaches far beyond the number of individuals that constitutes other
minority groups).
233. See id. at 7-8 (quoting Patricia Wright of the Disability Rights Education Defense Fund
who stated, “Disability knows no socioeconomic boundaries . . . . You can become disabled
from your mother’s poor nutrition or from falling off your polo pony.”).
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